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Terms of reference 
Advocacy;  Advocacy is at its core an appeal for action. That action can be policy change, 
funding, or virtually any other behavior; it can be a formal and well-planned process, or informal 
and impromptu, coming from experts, or celebrity spokespeople or the public at large. Advocacy 
experts VeneKlasen and Miller summarize advocacy as “an organized process involving 
coordinated efforts of people to change policies, practices, ideas, and values.” They also 
surround this definition with a discussion of how advocacy can take on drastically different 
forms and functions depending on the type of advocacy: public interest, policy, social justice, 
people-centered, participatory, or feminist advocacy. These are only the types acknowledged in 
their Action Guide book, and special interest groups of course have their own version 
(VeneKlasen & Miller, 2002). Advocacy as referenced in this paper encompasses a wide variety 
of methods, messages and messengers, but at their core, all are ultimately appeals for action. 
Bias;  Bias is an automatic psychological method of processing large amounts of information in 
a  small amount of time, or as Psychology Today states, “A bias is a tendency...But cognitive 
shortcuts can cause problems when we're not aware of them and apply them inappropriately, 
leading to rash decisions or discriminatory practices” (2017). It is this element of discriminatory 
practices that dominates popular use and understanding of bias, more similar to definitions of 
‘prejudice’ than a ‘tendency.’ 
Culture;  Culture is a complex and ephemeral concept to define, and infinite definitions exist. In 
an effort to ease some of the complexity, this paper will generally operate on a simple 
understanding of culture as a set of ideas, beliefs, behaviors, norms and knowledge that tie a 
group of people together within a society. These qualities are often historically passed down 
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through generations through unspoken norms, meaning it is often exercised not through a 
specific set of rules but rather an “intuitive grasp” of those norms (W. Dilthey, 1883, as cited in 
Williams, 1981, p. 15).  
Cultural imperialism;  Originally traced to Antonio Gramsci, the most basic definition of 
cultural imperialism is the power or influence of one group over another. A more modern 
definition states “Cultural imperialism is the economic, technological and cultural hegemony of 
the industrialized nations, which determines the direction of both economic and social progress, 
defines cultural values, and standardizes the civilization and cultural environment throughout the 
world” (Sarmela, 1975). 
Cultural relativism;  Relativist views of human rights or any other societal behavior, custom or 
policy argue that these qualities are all dependent on cultural interpretations and cannot be 
standardized across diverse societies. “Many agree that universal human rights norms simply do 
not conform with the extreme diversity of cultural and religious practices found around the world 
and that universal rights should be modified to conform with local cultural and religious 
norms...The variability in social and psychological characteristics across human groups is 
relative to--depends on--cultural variability” (Zechenter, 1997).  A “radical relativist” view goes 
farther to claim that culture is more than just a modifying factor: “culture is the sole source of the 
validity of a moral right or rule” (Donnelly, 1984).  
Democratization;  Put simply, democratization is the change from a non-democratic government 
to a democratic one, which provides the opportunity for participation in choosing a leader and 
the peaceful transfer of power from one leader to the next. The less simple aspect of the spread 
of democratization is the debate over whether the desire and the right to a democratic society is 
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indeed universal or a product of western influence and self-interest (see ‘cultural imperialism’). 
“Some analysts have also claimed that democracy is not an event or process but rather a journey, 
involving several transitional phases before it can reach maturity over a period of time...It is 
equally pertinent that democratisation is not something that can be imposed from outside as long 
as the conditions in the subjected society are not favourable. Some posit a universal craving for 
democratic choice (in other words, a preference for being asked rather than simply told who 
one’s rulers are to be); others emphasise strengths of democratic systems that make them models 
for emulation; others point to the role of evolving norms of ‘democratic governance’. In reality, a 
number of these may reinforce in each other. But much also depends on elite orientations, on 
cultural orientations, and on the wider regional and international environments in which 
territorial units find themselves” (Saikal, n.d.). “The question of the optimal political regime for 
governing human communities has been core to Western political philosophy since Antiquity 
(Plato’s Republic), as has been the question of the causes of change between political regime 
(Aristotle’s Politics)” (Samuels, 2011). 
Dissent;  Dissent is a subjective term, often only distinguished from protest or criminality 
through historical hindsight. Collins and Skover describe dissent as an engagement with larger 
society involving three key aspects: civic participation involving criticism of existing systems, 
intention to confront power from a relatively powerless position, and willingness to accept the 
consequences (2013). 
Human rights;  Human Rights Watch defines human rights as “a set of rules that govern what 
governments must do and what they must refrain from doing to respect the dignity each person 
has” (Roth, 2015), and human rights violations as the state failing to honor its obligations to 
protect and serve its citizens or its obligations to international law; additionally when the state 
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does not have mechanisms in place to put violent criminals on trial and offer recourse to victims 
(Sanei, 2015). The specific lists of what those rights include has been laid out by various authors 
throughout history and criticized every step of the way, for reasons to be analyzed  in this paper.  
Intervention;  Intervention as discussed here almost exclusively refers to international 
humanitarian intervention, which can be defined as  “a means to prevent or stop a gross violation 
of human rights in a state, where such state is either incapable or unwilling to protect its own 
people, or is actively persecuting them” (Jayakumar, 2012). However, the analysis presented 
here critiques that definition as rather idealistic, and presents a broader idea of intervention as 
any action to stop or change a current behavior in a foreign government, whether altruistic or 
strategic. The legality of international humanitarian interventions is complicated because the 
non-altruistic motivations are endless; “The legal status of humanitarian intervention poses a 
profound challenge to the future of global order” primarily due to the “concern that states would 
use the pretext of humanitarian intervention to wage wars for ulterior motives” or “ in important 
respects discourage wars with ulterior motives” (Goodman, 2006). 
Morality;  The set of conditions and experiences shaping morality or moral values are almost as 
subjective as moral values themselves. Morality includes elements of culture, experience, 
individual traits and ethics; put simply,  “both morality and ethics loosely have to do with 
distinguishing the difference between “good and bad” or “right and wrong.” Many people think 
of morality as something that’s personal and normative, whereas ethics is the standards of “good 
and bad” distinguished by a certain community or social setting” (Grannan, 2016).   
“Otherness”; This is essentially the layman’s version of outgroup homogeneity effect. Otherness 
describes the quality ascribed when broadly categorizing outgroups as significantly different 
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from ingroups, therefore unknown and unrelatable. This stereotyping (sometimes to the point of 
dehumanizing) effect can be exacerbated, sometimes intentionally, by messaging from authority, 
media, or public opinion. 
Outgroup homogeneity; This is a form of bias that is to some degree automatic, but can be 
weakened or strengthened according to environment and the willingness to seek out 
contradicting information. The effect is “ that in-group members perceive their own group as 
more variegated and complex than out-group members” (Park & Rothbart, 1982), leading to 
assumptions or stereotypes that groups to which one does not belong (like a particular religion or 
nationality) are generally in agreement about beliefs, attitudes and behaviors.   
Tipping point;  While not a word central to the thematic vocabulary of human rights and policy 
advocacy, tipping points are discussed often in this paper and so merit an explanation here. In 
this context, this refers to the point at which conditions change enough to lead to a new action or 
policy. Specifically this is used to describe the moment when the cost of inaction becomes 
greater than the cost of action, creating the possibility for intervention. 
Tradition;   The specifics of tradition are introduced here only to distinguish the larger concept 
of culture from more specific cultural traditions. Cultural traditions are a specific “pattern of 
thought, action, or behavior (such as a religious practice or a social custom)” that provide 
“cultural continuity in social attitudes, customs, and institutions” and are inherited or handed 
down from one generation to another (Merriam Webster, 2017). 
Universalism;  Debates about universalism and relativism can apply to many issues: human 
rights, optimal forms of government, moral values, etc. Universalism can refer to any basic 
features of humanity that apply to equally to every individual in the world. In the context of 
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human rights, universalism “holds that there is an underlying human unity which entitles all 
individuals, regardless of their cultural or regional antecedents, to certain basic minimal rights” 
(Zechenter, 1997). This disputes that cultural relativism has any role in determining basic rights, 
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Abstract 
 
This research addresses two basic yet exhaustive questions dictating the field of human rights 
advocacy. The first question surrounds the feasibility of implementing a universal list of human 
rights across contexts, and whether the attachment of moral values to discussions of human 
rights further obfuscates the ability to enforce them. What are universal human rights, and how 
do culture and politics challenge efforts to implement them? Three case studies, the Iranian 
revolution, the Rwandan genocide and the Salvadoran civil war, provide the backdrop to discuss 
practical strategies underlying ostensible human rights interventions and the tipping points at 
which those strategic goals led to intervention. The second question addresses the practical 
approaches to elicit action against human rights violations and provide protections for those in 
need. How can local groups or actors most effectively appeal to international audiences for 
intervention in human rights violations?  The goal is to provide clear analysis of how those 
advocating for intervention can effectively appeal to relevant strategies rather than morality in 
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Introduction 
Human rights law and advocacy efforts to adequately live up to that law are hotly 
contested concepts. There are many explanations for inconsistency; first, diverse cultural 
perspectives and priorities make standardized protections impossible. Second, there is a distinct 
lack of realistic, enforceable guidelines or consequences for violations. Arguably the most 
difficult explanation to confront, human rights protections for all in actuality take a backseat to 
the political and economic priorities for some. Critics claim that human rights are in fact just a 
facade for government actions toward strategic priorities. When human rights are violated, those 
appealing to the global community for action struggle for recognition and are too often ignored 
while those with the power to intervene chase other goals. 
Human rights and cultural preservation are two concepts that seem inextricably linked 
while at the same time, directly at odds with each other. Both rights and culture are based in 
value systems, the roots of which are often simple and shared, but represent behaviors that 
become complex and distinct in diverse contexts (Zechenter, 1997).  Culture can help or hinder 
protections and interventions in human rights; it can create bias, provide excuses to avoid 
involvement, or prevent understanding and collaboration between advocates, victims, and 
interveners. Culture defines our understanding of rights and morality and how both can evolve 
and adapt. 
Advocacy for human rights protections often take the form of morality, calls to “do the 
right thing.” This type of message sets up both parties for failure before the debate can even 
begin. In any society that is not completely homogenous, there exists no single standard moral 
code just as there exists no single standard culture. The differences abundant in moral 
interpretation weaken policies based on supposedly universal morality--including human rights--
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rather than setting a useable standard. As David Kennedy observed, “As an absolute language of 
righteousness and moral aspiration came to be used strategically, human rights became less 
compelling, easy to interpret as nothing but strategy, cover for the political objectives, particular 
interests clothing themselves in the language of the universal” (Kennedy, 2012, p.22). 
The primary role of government is not to standardize moral guidance, but to serve the 
measurable needs of their constituents: security, shelter, food, work, health care, and education 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2011)--though ideally they try to 
provide these in a way morally acceptable to all their constituents. When a choice is faced 
between serving measurable needs and serving a moral code (i.e. immeasurable needs), 
measurable success always come first (Schlangan, 2014). When moral values are present in 
policies, they are values specific to those in power (Tudoreanu, 2012). Morality in government is 
a convenient disguise for strategy when all is well, and an inconvenient nuisance to be tabled for 
the sake of security (or other measurable need) when all is not. 
Despite this rationale that governments cannot operate on moral values while 
representative of diverse populations, people still critique leaders and actions based on their 
perceived morality. This may be due to the emotional power of morality outweighing rational 
analysis--morality is intuitive, so all constituents have an understanding of their own moral 
values, albeit different understandings--or due simply to the fact that few people can understand 
all the political and economic strategies of the public sector, which are not intuitive but complex 
and learned. 
To serve these needs, the practical inclination in government is to 1) maintain order and 
stability; and 2) avoid costly intervention in international conflicts with little reward (Binder, 
2017). Intervention has a clear cost, whether money, resources, lives or political capital, while 
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avoiding intervention has hidden costs instead--hidden because those costs are paid by 
populations kept out of the public sphere by systematic oppression. Non-intervention most 
directly affects the populations being oppressed, but can have costs to the government with the 
potential to intervene as well (Binder, 2017). There is a tipping point at which the cost of non-
intervention becomes greater than the cost of intervention, and only then will action happen. That 
cost can be any category: economic trade or sanctions, market price changes, political capital, 
loss of resources exported from the country in question, increase in refugees, or mounting 
pressure from the public at a level that jeopardizes job security for those in power (re-election).  
This assessment is at best pragmatic, at worst pessimistic--no universal human rights, no 
morality in government--but the point is not to stop trying to pursue those goals, rather to avoid 
standardizing them. Standardization when culture is involved, while potentially increasing 
efficiency, leads to an absence of critical growth as well as stifled diversity and inequitable 
expectations (Au, 2009). These are not gains but severe and irreversible losses. To maintain 
human rights and protective government policies, advocates cannot demand adherence to their 
own moral codes; they must do the work to construct pragmatic messages calling for specific 
actions in alignment with those moral codes that also serve measureable needs of the population 
in order to allow the government (or other advocacy targets) to heed the message.  
Literature Review 
Human rights, universalism, and cultural relativism  
The universalist idea of human rights has been evolving for centuries, from ancient 
philosophers and theologians discussions of ethics and the role of governments, to the first 
official list agreed upon by most countries beginning in 1948. Socrates saw human rights less as 
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the freedom for particular actions and more as the freedom to be the true form of one’s self; Plato 
disagreed with the egalitarian view, claiming rights should be based on intellect and potential 
contributions to society; Thomas Hobbes saw human rights as the “civil rights required for 
peaceful relations between individuals-- right to be left in peace.” (Butler, 2008, p. 5). Benjamin 
Franklin succinctly outlined basic rights as life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights first developed by the United Nations (UN) in 1948 
included “life, liberty and security of person” in the third of its 30 articles (United Nations 
General Assembly, 1948). Both cultural relativism and individual constructs of morality make 
the discourse on human rights one that will never and can never come to an objective and 
universal conclusion. 
Since its inception, the UN’s attempt to implement standardized rights across the world 
has faced heavy criticism for western bias, vague interpretations and unenforceable guidelines. 
Article 29 in the 1948 declaration actually states “everyone shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and 
respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, 
public order and the general welfare in a democratic society” (United Nations General Assembly, 
1948).  The assumption of a democratic society preempts any denials of the biased nature of this 
declaration, and the “just requirements of morality” establishes a precedent of ambiguity and 
subjective interpretation that still plagues every discussion of the concept today.  
As much as policy makers and advocates try, there can be no perfect international union 
free from bias (at best) or cultural imperialism (at worst). The United Nations attempted this, and 
is consistently criticized for bias toward top donor countries and five permanent members of the 
security council. Eric Posner explains how the original list of human rights was contested 
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between the United States and Soviet Union because the US focused on political rights while the 
USSR focused on social rights, eventually leading to separate covenants acknowledging both 
versions (Posner, 2014).  
The two resulting treaties adopted in 1966, the The International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, include 
31 and 53 articles respectively (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 
1966), and ample opportunity for confusion, criticism and avoidance. The Human Rights Office 
of the High Commissioner lists the “Core” human rights instruments and monitoring bodies, and 
of the 18 instruments listed, nine of the titles include the word “optional” (United Nations 
Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 2017). This immediately casts a shadow of 
“options” in the discussion of human rights as a whole, and the ability to choose which are 
necessary and which are not, invalidating the notion that any of them are universal at all. The 
sheer volume of rights listed requires prioritizing some over others when managing complex 
situations, and interpretations of those priorities and the rights themselves is anything but 
consistent. Posner highlights the example of US prioritizing free speech while China prioritizes 
economic opportunity, and many Islamic countries outlaw defamation of Islam to prioritize 
freedom of religion (2014). 
The Responsibility to Protect doctrine emerging in 2005 attempted to counter the 
challenges allowing members to avoid action in previous declarations of human rights by 
invoking calls to morality. This immediately set up the new effort on a platform of intrinsic bias, 
closer to efforts of a colonial past than a utopian future. Pingeot and Obenland summarize this 
well: “Indeed, many progressively-minded groups in the 19th and early 20th centuries were 
mobilized in favor of colonial intervention and enthusiastically endorsed the idea that 
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colonialism would lift native people out of ignorance, backwardness, and misery. Today, R2P 
resonates well with governments keen to demonstrate international moral leadership in the 
protection of human rights and with civil society organizations that advocate for similar values”  
(2014). 
Setting aside discussions of bias among the rights themselves, bias involved in the ability 
to implement them directly serves to hurt developing countries (Council on Foreign Relations, 
2012). If the legal system and more importantly social structure of a country already exists 
within the image of these rights, maintaining them is plausible. If adherence to the 84 articles in 
the international covenants, or even just the 30 articles in the universal declaration, requires 
significant change to the legal or social systems (which is more often than not the case in non-
western, non-democratic societies), it is undeniably impossible to change that many laws, 
behaviors and attitudes overnight, or even over a generation.  
Rights and behaviors are exercised not according to laws themselves, but rather societies’ 
interpretations and acceptance or rejection of the laws. In an exploration of the parameters of 
dissent, Collins and Skover eloquently describe law as “both a mirror and a mold of how 
[citizens] think, speak, and act” (2013, p. 59). Collins and Skover’s analysis limits the power of 
interpretation to lawmakers rather than society as a whole, or more precisely, “the beneficence of 
lawmakers. The length and breadth of a right is determined less by constitutional declarations 
than by legislative decrees” (2013, p. 111). To put this argument into tangible context, Mona 
Eltahaway describes conversations with multiple high ranking members of the Egyptian 
leadership and the Muslim Brotherhood related to regulating the hijab or niqab among Egyptian 
women. Eltahaway illustrates how different interpretations of the same Qur’an passages 
effectively changed the meaning of existing law to require veiling without having to change the 
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law itself  (Eltahawy, 2015, p. 47). Laws, rights and responsibilities are subject to interpretation. 
The interpretation of human rights in a society determines the behavior of its citizens, the law 
only serves to provide legitimacy to the prevailing interpretation. Changing a system to adhere to 
a new principle of rights requires far more than changing a law--it requires changing the attitudes 
and beliefs of those who follow the law and those who enforce it--police, judges, juries, 
witnesses in court, even neighbors who might make the call to the police.  
Intervention: Enforcing interpretations 
Cultures evolve, and with them interpretations of laws and rights, and eventually, the 
written form of those laws and rights. The natural evolution of culture can be stifled however, 
through oppression, or misdirected insistence on preservation of aspects that might otherwise 
change. Along with oppressive authorities is the tacit support shown when others decline to 
challenge that authority, whether out of self-interest, apathy, or ignorance. “Culture evolves, but 
it will remain static if outsiders consistently silence criticism in a misguided attempt to save us 
from ourselves. Cultures evolve through dissent and robust criticism from their members. When 
westerners remain silent out of “respect” for foreign cultures, they show support only for the 
most conservative elements of those cultures. Cultural relativism is as much my enemy as the 
oppression I fight within my culture and faith” (Eltahawy, 2015, p. 28)  
Many reluctant arguments exist to avoid intervention in international human rights 
violations, and culture provides several. This claim of silence due to cultural “respect” or 
neutrality is a common argument for western countries in international conflicts. However, if 
culture is shaped and reshaped through national traumas (Lewis, 2007, p. 5), implying that 
revolutions and civil wars are in effect processing cultural change, that nullifies the argument 
that the pre-conflict cultural norms are unchallengeable. Revolutions happen when members 
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within a culture enact change from the inside, leading their own culture to evolve and adapt 
(Collins & Skover, 2013). Outsiders avoid acknowledging the change and the differences 
between members of the same culture through a bias called outgroup homogeneity.  
What psychologists describe as “outgroup homogeneity” can be simplified with the 
increasingly common and less sophisticated label “otherness.” The basic concept is that humans 
have the tendency to see more diversity within groups to which they belong--their own race, 
religion, nationality, socio-economic status, education level, etc.--and see groups to which they 
do not belong as homogenous, whether in appearance, intellect or attitude (Park & Rothbart, 
1982). This is a natural psychological tendency, but one that can be either dispelled or reinforced 
through environment. Authorities take advantage of this principle by dehumanizing “others” 
regarded as a threat. Nazi Germany launched broad media campaigns depicting Jewish people as 
inferior and comparing them with rats; Hutu controlled Rwanda did the same toward the Tutsi; 
America has seen broad group defamation towards Native Americans as brutal savages in the 
early 1800’s, Japanese as enemy invaders during WWII, communists as treasonous Russian spies 
in the 1950’s, and Muslims as terrorists following 9/11.  
Drawing attention to the use of violence (or labeling actions as violence) committed by a 
group of “others” is an effective and convenient way to manipulate the dehumanizing stereotype 
of an entire group, and to cast them as anything from ignorant to angry to criminal. “[Violence] 
creates delusion--it allows both sides to see themselves as the victim and the other as the 
aggressor” (Lewis, 2007, p. 16). This is nearly universal in war; all parties involved see the harm 
done to them by the other as devastating and unwarranted, but the harm done by them to the 
other as necessary tactical success. Clear manipulation is evident in the case of Iran before and 
after the revolution; pre-revolution, the Shah’s regime executed dissidents as violent criminals, 
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and post-revolution, the Ayatollah’s regime executed former Shah supporters as corrupt 
murderers (Cottham, 1980). Both were done in the name of social justice, both were murder. 
Power carries with it the ability to create the narrative through authority, trust, or control. 
Dissent is a means of criticism or inciting change that does not inherently include 
violence, described by Collins and Skover as a combination of civic participation and criticism 
of existing systems, intention to confront power from a relatively powerless position, and 
willingness to accept the consequences (2013). Revolution, civil war, social change movements, 
and advocacy efforts almost always begin with small acts of dissent and grow to the scale 
required by the situation. Dissent connotes a kind of noble image of standing up for one’s moral 
code, while violence carries the opposite image of abandoning morality. “The currency of dissent 
is devalued when aligned with violence” (Collins & Skover, 2013, p. 69), despite the hypocrisy 
that dissenters in oppressive societies are usually met with state-sanctioned violence designed to 
suppress their criticism of the state. Regardless of what the authority may do with impunity, 
dissenters--including advocates for intervention on human rights violations--are labeled at the 
first sign of violence or even civic disruption, as violent criminals and thereby discredited. Only 
hindsight can reframe a “criminal” act as worthwhile dissent after the cause has been won or 
public opinion shifted (Collins & Skover, 2013, p. 124). 
Those with power to determine the narrative control how an act is broadcasted to the 
world, and more easily still, how it is remembered in collective historical memory. An 
appropriate sentiment and perfect example: “history is a set of lies agreed upon,” is a quote 
widely credited to Napoleon Bonaparte though in actuality has been traced in various forms to so 
many well-known individuals across centuries that citing it is meaningless. Public narratives can 
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determine after a conflict which side was “right,” and either build up political figures as heroes 
or condemn them as criminals (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). 
Public narratives cannot be shaped by power alone, they are interpreted by and through 
the media. Power depends on the public accepting it, or electing it. Examinations of public 
acceptance (i.e. election polls) often add and subtract voters as uncritical masses to be easily 
controlled, following the media-driven public rhetoric at the time. As Cohen summarized, the 
media “may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is 
stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about” (Cohen, 1963, as cited in 
McCombs & Shaw, 1972, p. 177). This is true to the extent that the people trust the media, but 
once the standard shifts to become untrustworthy, public attention can and will grow to match 
the need. The public can and will seek out or create alternate forms of information sharing if the 
media does not. Social media makes this simple today, though the practice has always existed. In 
the days of the revolution, the Ayatollah and others routinely distributed cassette tapes with 
messages to followers (Eltahaway, 2015). In WWII, the French resistance printed secret 
pamphlets and transferred coded messages through everything from songs to supermarkets 
(Kehoe, 1997). There is an ebb and flow to trust and complacency between the public and 
publicity, and international attention and action matches this ebb and flow in a delayed reaction 
akin to a boat adjusting to changes in the tide.  
Strategic priorities versus human rights 
While culture, laws and interpretations of rights all evolve, slower to evolve are the 
global authority systems that implement and enforce these rights. Even judgements from the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) take decades to conclude after the potential role of justice in 
resolution of the conflict has passed. Global Policy Forum’s annual lists of key documents and 
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articles from ICJ show a significant number of cases still being processed from the 1940’s, 
1950’s and 1960’s (Global Policy Forum, 2017). The delay is in part due to the cultural 
subjectivity in doing so, and in part to the competing demands of political and economic 
obligations and goals. Though the specifics of how to do so vary widely, philosophers, and 
multinational organizations generally agree on the primary role of government as providing order 
and basic needs for their own people (Butler, 2008, Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2011). This means sovereign governments without exception have first and 
foremost a self interest in maintaining and protecting their state, and second, maintaining and 
protecting its role in the international community. Furthermore, the ability of the ICJ and other 
international authorities to enforce international judgements on sovereign governments is 
extremely limited without their consent (Schlamp, 2012). (While this is necessarily the case, 
some governments are quicker to respond to the needs of those around them than others, 
particularly clear in international crises (Pinoget & Obenland, 2014). This might be interpreted 
as a culturally determined moral act, or it might be in the self-interest of socio-political capital.) 
Part of that self-interest involves maintaining order and stability at the geopolitical level, 
but more importantly in any country or region in which the government in question has a vested 
political or economic interest. Policies tend to favor maintaining “order and stability” as the 
opposite of war and chaos (Lewis, 2007). However, maintaining order means maintaining the 
status quo, and the status quo can certainly be chaos to many people while those in power 
controlling the public narrative enjoy a level of order the rest do not. Order and stability are not 
synonymous with freedom, justice or general welfare, and can in fact be at their highest in 
brutally oppressive regimes. In many cases, the mere appearance of order and stability allows the 
foreign government to conduct its business without acknowledging the chaotic or brutal reality 
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(Human Rights Watch, 1999). Typically regimes with the most egregious human rights 
violations and corruption have policies in place that are generally positive and progressive; the 
problem lies in the implementation, or lack thereof. In the cases presented here, Iran, Rwanda 
and El Salvador illustrate this dissonance between policy and practice (Cottham, 1980; Human 
Rights Watch, 1999; Michaels, 1987). 
Clear as that dissonance may be, the fact remains governments acting internationally 
have business to conduct, security to maintain, and social capital to build. They have a vested 
interest in prolonging that order and stability and wherever possible, resolving issues of 
instability through diplomatic processes rather than direct intervention. The United States sees 
itself as the prototype for democracy, and though its own “roots lie in revolution,” the US 
actively works to prevent other countries from revolution unless it can guarantee success and 
positive relations with the new leadership to deliver a higher level of order and stability to 
American interests (Katovich, 1993, p.48). This is why leaders in undeniably oppressive regimes 
like King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, can be “hailed as a ‘reformer’--even by those who ought to 
know better” for advances like promising to give women the right to vote in 2015 despite the fact 
that being a victim of rape was still punishable by jail time (Eltahawy, 2015, p. 9). This 
illustrates how supposedly committed rhetoric from both the regime and the commentators is all 
for show. Empty promises are enough to mollify international attention and excuse the actual 
behavior. 
It can be self-interest, apathy or ignorance, or a combination of the three driving this 
apparent desire to accept empty promises and call for patience, to prolong making any 
investment in a situation until it is impossible to avoid. This is evident in government action in 
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any sector, both internationally and domestically. In his Letter from Birmingham Jail, Martin 
Luther King Jr. criticized this reluctance during the civil rights movement:  
I have almost reached the regrettable conclusion that the Negro's great stumbling block in 
his stride toward freedom is not the White Citizen's Counciler or the Ku Klux Klanner, 
but the white moderate, who is more devoted to "order" than to justice; who prefers a 
negative peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence 
of justice; who constantly says: "I agree with you in the goal you seek, but I cannot agree 
with your methods of direct action"; who paternalistically believes he can set the 
timetable for another man's freedom; who lives by a mythical concept of time and who 
constantly advises the Negro to wait for a "more convenient season. (King, 1963). 
Unfortunately justice, like morality, is subjective. While a government is obligated to 
operate on strategic value over morality, they still claim moral motivations when useful to garner 
support. “When nations send their military forces into other nations' territory, it is rarely (if ever) 
for "humanitarian" purposes. They are typically pursuing their narrow national interest - 
grabbing territory, gaining geo-strategic advantage, or seizing control of precious natural 
resources. Leaders hope to win public support by describing such actions in terms of high moral 
purposes - bringing peace, justice, democracy and civilization to the affected area” (Pingeot & 
Obenland, 2014).  In advocacy campaigns, advocacy experts know this and plan accordingly. 
(However, major advocacy campaigns do not only include experts, they include the public at at 
large, voters, media, celebrities--people who do not operate according to the experts’ plans, nor 
are accountable to them (Aly, 2015).)  
It is not government but the private and social sectors with the power and obligation to 
push the importance of human rights policies, and to increase the cost to governments for failing 
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to live up to their word. In situations where human rights are being violated, there is a direct and 
indirect cost of both action and inaction. Every context has a different tipping point at which the 
cost of inaction becomes greater than the cost of action, and only then do governments act. 
Binder breaks down the calculation of this cost as a combination of four distinct areas, including: 
human suffering, potential regional instability, chances of success of an intervention, and 
material or reputational resources (2017). Only when those four categories indicate an 
intervention is “worthwhile” does that tipping point occur. In governments that are accountable 
to mitigate the cost of every action they take against the benefit to their own citizens, public 
pressure (as effects either re-election or the “reputational resource” of political capital) has some 
influence in bringing on the tipping point that will compel governments to act.  
Intergovernmental bodies like the UN can build monitoring mechanisms for international 
human rights agreements, though they lack real power until the public gets involved. The 
Council on Foreign Relations confirms “these mechanisms are far from consistent. Generally, 
when they are effective, they change states' conduct by publicizing abuses rather than by 
providing technical advice or applying punitive measures. For example, no global body was 
capable of forcing the United States to stop its mistreatment of detainees at the Guantanamo Bay 
Detention Facility, but mounting international pressure did encourage fundamental U.S. reform 
of its detention and interrogation policies in 2009. As a result, skeptics also counter that other 
grassroots movements or organizations hold greater responsibility for rights improvements than 
global institutions” (2012). 
Once the tipping point has been reached and intervention is imminent, culture is again a 
vital determinant for the long term success or failure of an intervention. Despite this, “culture, 
comprised of all that is vague and intangible, is not generally integrated into strategic planning 
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except at the most superficial level. And yet it is precisely ‘all that is vague and intangible’ 
which defines low-intensity conflicts” (Belbutowski, P., as cited in Lewis, 2007, p. 10). Lewis 
goes on to describe how a lack of understanding of the opponents prevented positive outcomes in 
Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. Militarily, the US possessed the strength necessary to secure a 
defeat in war, but strategically, did not possess the cultural knowledge to facilitate an 
intervention that would lead to a constructive end. Cultural understanding and navigation can 
mean the difference between effective intervention and imperialistic invasion. In Iraq 
specifically, US leadership “did not understand the cultural tenets of Iraq, believing the Iraqi 
people would welcome US soldiers as liberators” (2007, p. 10). 
Perhaps if the goal were really to benefit the suffering people of another country by 
intervening to prevent violations of human rights, cultural understanding and constructive 
solutions would prevail. If the goal is to further economic and political gains and maintain self-
serving order, then the complicated task of culturally relevant strategic planning is an 
unnecessary cost. There is little evidence to demonstrate the cost benefit of incorporating cultural 
training into strategic planning as it is rarely done, but there is ample evidence to suggest that the 
absence of doing so can lead to interventions that cause more problems than they solve (Lewis, 
2007). 
To synthesize the critical views described here, 1) human rights are subject to cultural 
interpretation and priority, and therefore cannot be enforced infallibly through standardization; 2) 
governments cannot operate based on morality because that would require utilizing cultural bias, 
and instead operate on strategic priorities; 3) strategic goals determine a tipping point at which 
intervention in international human rights violations becomes possible; 4) public pressure plays a 
significant role in forcing that tipping point to occur; 5) without an understanding of the cultural 
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forces at play in the situation itself, international intervention has an uneven effect on the long 
term outcomes.  
The three cases that follow are examples of drastic and long standing human rights 
violations by regimes supported in western countries who overlooked those violations to 
prioritize economic or political stability. Each case saw years of advocacy efforts and appeals to 
action before international intervention finally occurred. Each conflict had cultural elements used 
by the international community to delay intervention, and each had a leader maintaining a facade 
of order and stability while the reality was deteriorating quickly.  These case studies will 
examine the tipping point when the cost of intervention became worthwhile, and how that point 
arrived.  
Methods 
Research and conclusions presented here are a result of analytical desk review of existing 
discourse on human rights policy, interventionist strategy and cultural relativism. Research 
included peer reviewed literature, UN publications, declassified internal CIA reports, 
autobiographical and historical analysis books, and popular media sources. Each of these 
subjects, as well as each of the three case studies from Iran, Rwanda and El Salvador, can and 
have filled thousands of pages of books and journals, so the research presented here provides a 
very brief synthesis. 
The role of bias is a key feature in this analysis of human rights and intervention. The 
research process made every attempt to seek out a variety of sources and authors from differing 
perspectives and origins in order to create as unbiased an analysis as possible, though 
acknowledges that this is an impossible feat. The ideals of equality and freedom to express 
individual rights are tenets of democracy, and the spread of democracy is arguably a western 
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ideological goal. Nevertheless, equality and freedom in human rights are presented here as goals 
deserving of advocacy and international intervention. Each author is subject to the bias of 
environment, ideology and current events, though as discussed here in the context of cultural 
relativism, an understanding of the unique bias in a particular situation can serve as a useful 
framework to understand the arguments being made and to either put them into practice or 
deliver a constructive counterargument.  
Results 
Iranian Revolution: 1979 
The Iranian revolution of 1979, like the other two cases examined here, represented the 
convergence of a series of complex situations, events, strategies, and social changes. Neither this 
revolution nor any other revolution can be summarized based on one simple set of 
circumstances. This case study does not intend to simplify or neglect any aspects, but 
acknowledging that they cannot all be captured in a short analysis, those aspects focused on here 
will be the cultural clash between Iranian leaders and western influences, advocacy appeals to 
western audiences for intervention, and the underlying strategic goals. 
Cultural relativism is a prevalent theme in debates about Iran’s past and future (Afshari, 
2001). Simplistic comments about the revolution of 1979 characterize it as an Islamic revolution, 
and credit the modernizing, western reforms of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi as a catalyst to 
resistance from a traditional conservative public. Deeper analysis shows that the Islamic 
motivators for the revolution were limited, as was the support for Ayatollah Khomeini among 
other Islamic leaders (Arjomand, 1986). Ayatollah Khomeini was not the beloved charismatic 
leader he claimed, and not only the left wing academics and entrepreneurs disagreed with his 
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vision, but many of his own religious peers distanced themselves from him as well 
(Keshavarzian, 2009). Because he was already well-known in his opposition to the Shah and 
represented everything the Shah did not, he gave the revolution the best chance to succeed so 
varied opposition groups rallied behind him. 
Several factions came together to make the revolution happen, including religious 
followers of Ayatollah Khomeini, secular academics, and low income laborers. Each of these 
groups reacted to different aspects of the Shah’s regime, and each had different goals in 
revolution, though none had the strength or support necessary to accomplish revolution alone 
(Cottham, 1980). Motivations and goals for each of the three groups included adherence to the 
constitution and pillars of Islam that were not being followed by the Shah, freedom of education 
and press, and economic reform in response to the high inflation of the mid 1970’s (Nelson, 
2016). As the Shah began making (or claiming to make) advances toward political and economic 
freedoms, each of these groups exercised their growing rights to demonstrate opposition, only to 
be met with brutal crackdowns in retaliation (Cottham, 1980). Each very public supposed step 
forward toward human rights policies were followed less publicly by two steps back. It wasn’t 
until US President Jimmy Carter and his human rights commitment at the beginning of his new 
administration that the separate groups began working together toward a shared mission of 
overthrowing the Shah. 
A key advocacy action taken by a group of Iranian citizens demonstrates the direct 
contradiction between stated human rights policy and action by Carter’s administration. Carter 
began his 1977 administration with a supposedly committed pledge to secure and protect human 
rights across the world, and in response to his own pledge and ongoing relationship with the 
Shah, a group of activists wrote a comprehensive letter detailing human rights abuses under the 
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Shah’s regime and requesting intervention--intervention that Carter’s own declaration should 
have required (Cottham, 1980). This call to action was blatantly ignored, and the authors of this 
letter were persecuted. Even after demonstrators were killed in 1978 en masse (actually numbers 
vary by source), Carter affirmed ongoing support of the Shah’s regime and congratulated 
progress toward improving human rights conditions (Nelson, 2016). 
  Carter, like any president, might have had a personal commitment to human rights, but he 
had a more demanding political commitment to the system before him to maintain the status quo 
between the US and Iran. Iran has long been a strategic ally fought for by both the US and 
Russia, concerning influence in the region and military operations, as well as oil price control 
and other trade. So strong is the strategic importance, that in opposition to his own platform of 
human rights just three years prior, Jimmy Carter made the following statement in a State of the 
Union address in 1980: “Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to 
gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the 
United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including 
military force” (Jones, 2012). Military force was considered necessary means for protecting the 
“vital interests of the US” though it was not considered necessary to protect those suffering 
human rights violations within the region. 
  Oil proved to be the most significant of those vital interests of concern during and after 
the revolution. “These concerns proved to be correct because the Iranian revolution resulted in 
the curbing of one-fifth of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ (OPEC) 
production capability. This Iranian oil cutoff strained the oil market immediately. American 
media automatically began speculating on how high oil prices would rise because of Iran’s 
policies. The U.S. bought approximately 200 million fewer barrels of oil during 1979. By 
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December, world oil prices were approximately fifty percent higher than when Iran first cut back 
the oil supply” (Wyse, 2011, p. 9). The importance of Iranian oil was just one, albeit extremely 
significant, reason the US was highly motivated to maintain the authority of the Shah. 
  The US had a major stake in maintaining the government of the Shah beyond oil and the 
stability in the region; American support had been backing the Shah and his royal family since 
the 1953 overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq that brought him to power. 
Declassified CIA documents published in the National Security Archives officially label 
American involvement in the 1953 coup unequivocally as a “Campaign to Install a Pro-Western 
Government in Iran” with the recorded objectives stating “through legal, or quasi-legal, methods 
to effect the fall of the Mossadeq government; and to replace it with a pro-western government 
under the Shah’s leadership” (Central Intelligence Agency, 1953). The Shah was in effect 
brought to power due to his American allegiance, hence the US had every strategic reason to 
support a guaranteed ally. After he was ousted by the revolution and Ayatollah Khomeini, he 
was granted asylum in the United States to live out his dying days. The citizens of Iran 
demanded his return to be put on trial and the US government refused, protecting its ally, leading 
to the storming of the US embassy in Tehran and the ensuing hostage crisis (Cottham, 1980). 
  Despite the countless reports of human rights violations under the Shah and in later years 
under the Ayatollah, the only American military intervention surrounding the revolution was in 
an attempt to recover its own hostages. The UN since appointed a Special Representative to 
examine the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran, with little results. “Despite 
the passage of many years of intense interaction with the UN human rights organs and the 
Special Representatives, and the issuance of hundreds of UN reports, resolutions and pleas, the 
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[Iranian] diplomats still refused to treat the issues related to the charges of human rights 
violations with a modicum of straightforwardness and honesty” (Afshari, 2001, p. 285). 
Officials within the regime validated this refusal with the argument of cultural relativism. 
Cultural relativist exceptions have been claimed in the exercise of human rights within 
Iran by many members of the Ayatollah’s regime, stating that the regime is in fact operating 
within a different but equally valid, culturally determined parameter of human rights. Iran’s 
Foreign Minister Kharrazi called current UN human rights policies “restrictive bonds of 
monopolistic claims of a particular culture and ideology” (Kharrazi, as cited in Afshari, 2001,p. 
285) and demanded that Iran be exempt to follow its own ideology. International observers 
struggle with whether to respect this argument while simultaneously observing systematic 
oppression of women, political prisoners and leftist journalists. This debate sparks the question 
of how to see past bias when determining whether international conflicts merit intervention, or if 
intervention would serve as just a new form of western cultural imperialism (Zechenter, 1997). 
  Internal dissent provides a key factor for determining the validity of cultural relativism as 
an exception; if the members within that culture do not consistently accept the system as just, 
then culture cannot be an overriding factor. Unfortunately, even large scale dissent or opposition 
sometimes struggles to be recognized by outside observers. “Most studies of nondemocratic 
countries neglect oppositional groups and concentrate on the institutions, policies and social 
bases of the ruling regimes...This overall neglect of oppositional activity in nondemocratic 
regimes can easily lead to an overestimation of these regimes’ stability” (Chelabi,1990, p. 2). 
This means even when the regime is providing just a facade of human rights policies while 
facing dissent and impending revolution, outside forces may be blind to the reality. 
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Intervention in this case can be critiqued as either imperialistic influence from the Carter 
administration for the Shah to make advances in human rights, or it can be viewed as the events 
preceding and following the hostage crisis. Influence from the Carter administration resulted in 
further instability in the Shah’s administration via oppression and opposition once it proved to be 
nothing but lip service, satisfied by reciprocal lip service from the Shah. It was actually the 
hypocrisy of Carter’s position rather than his position itself that instigated further response from 
Iranian activists (Afshari, 2001). The direct military involvement was also a strategic failure that 
led to the deaths of several hostages and further alienated (and validated) the new extremist 
regime. 
In this case, the strategic goals of American interest in Iran promoted maintaining a stable 
if troubled ally in a contested region, as well as oil market prices. Confronting the Shah on his 
violations would have meant disrupting both, and pushing Iran closer to the arms of Russia. Both 
Carter and the Shah spoke about improving conditions of human rights to smooth some of the 
outcry, though neither was particularly believable. The US did not commit fully to take action in 
the region until after the revolution had occurred, and then only to protect its own citizens, none 
of the suffering activists of Iran. Even in ensuing years, economic sanctions claiming to target 
Iran’s human rights abuses are weak attempts focused on nuclear proliferation (self-serving 
security interests of the US) rather than on human rights of Iranians. “Last month the Treasury 
Department imposed the first human rights-related sanctions designations against Iranian 
individuals and entities since December 2014, and we will continue to pursue initiatives around 
the world that uphold our core values of promoting and protecting human rights...The action 
reflects concern with Iran’s continued development of ballistic missiles, which is in inconsistent 
with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231...The State Department will continue to 
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partner with our colleagues at the Department of the Treasury to ensure our national security in 
the face of Iranian threats” (United States Institute of Peace, 2017). 
The Carter administration’s inaction toward the human rights violations of the Shah 
failed to prevent the coup and directly led to the hostage crisis and ensuing years of animosity 
between the two countries. International influence supported order and stability under the Shah 
(and after transfer of power was imminent, under the Ayatollah as well) rather than an actual 
demand for rights and justice to be served to those responsible for violations of rights. This case 
demonstrates how using human rights as a facade to maintain even tenuous economic and 
political relationships led to decades of animosity rather than order and justice. It is also a stark 
example of cultural relativism serving as a handicap to the implementation of human rights 
policies and law. 
Rwandan Genocide: 1994 
The genocide that killed 800,000 Tutsi over 100 days in Rwanda in 1994 did not come as 
a surprise to anyone paying attention to rising tensions in the region. Brutality from the Hutu 
controlled government had been building, propaganda attacking the Tutsi had been increasing, 
and militarization of civilians was clear (Adelman, 1996). International actors within the country 
reached out to their counterparts to request action, and were denied. Some were even recalled 
and replaced with new ambassadors more favorable to the Hutu regime under President Juvénal 
Habyarimana and maintaining the existing status quo. “Among the African countries, only the 
Ambassador of Tanzania took a strong, outspoken position on human rights violations. As a 
result – and in consequence of Tanzania’s weak economic leverage – Habyarimana asked in late 
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1993 that the Ambassador be replaced with another one. Tanzania complied” (Adelman, 1996, p. 
30) 
Violence between the Hutu majority and Tutsi minority in Rwanda was no new 
phenomenon by the 1990’s, nor were rebel groups challenging the regime in power among 
several countries in the region. These facts made it easy for the international community to write 
off building tensions between the Rwandan government and the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) 
opposition as “business as usual” unworthy of closer attention (Harsch, 2004). As drastic human 
rights abuses and violent confrontations increased from 1990 to 1993, concern and resources 
were focused elsewhere. In 1994, warnings had been issued by human rights groups and 
representatives in country to governments and to the UN, which were largely ignored. Even after 
the massacres had begun, UN troops withdrew after 10 Belgians were killed (10 Belgians 
defending the some 100,000 Tutsi already killed by that time). Only weeks later did the UN vote 
to send additional troops, and it was months before they actually arrived (Harsch, 2004).  
At the time, international attention was more focused on ongoing conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia, an area with more immediate relevance to western powers, particularly European 
powers and peripherally the US as a strong ally of the European Union. Rwanda held little 
strategic value in terms of political relationships in the region and economic potential, and the 
government itself was stable enough to avoid. “From 1990 on, influential donors of international 
aid pressed Habyarimana for political and economic reforms. But, generally satisfied with the 
stability of his government, they overlooked the systematic discrimination against Tutsi which 
violated the very principles that they were urging him to respect” (Human Rights Watch, 1999). 
The same report goes on to compare the relationship between maintaining the status quo and 
maintaining democracy. “Some policymakers, particularly in France and in Belgium, were 
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wedded to the notion that an ethnic majority was necessarily the same as a democratic majority. 
They could not bring themselves to condemn the genocide because they feared increasing the 
likelihood of an RPF victory and the subsequent establishment of a government dominated by 
the minority” (Human Rights Watch, 1999).  
When the violence was too obvious to ignore, officials cited cultural excuses to avoid 
intervention; “At the time, Western politicians even refrained from describing events in Rwanda 
as genocide. Then US President Bill Clinton instead called it a ‘tribal war’” (Pelz & Corbett, 
2009). This refusal to acknowledge perpetrators and victims of violence separately and the depth 
of damage being done is a clear example of dehumanizing “otherness” by western governments 
reluctant to invest. A New York Times article from June of 1994 epitomizes how the association 
with violence is used to characterize both sides as criminal: “Witnesses have said Tutsis were the 
victims of the worst violence, much of it carried out systematically by Government troops and 
Hutu militias, but Hutus have been killed in reprisal and in battles with the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front, the Tutsi-led rebel group that now controls half of Rwanda” (Jehl, 1994). 
Despite his article contributing to the unsympathetic portrayal of ethnic massacre, 
Douglas Jehl goes on to criticize the Clinton administration for its own blatant avoidance of 
responsibility. “Trying to avoid the rise of moral pressure to stop the mass killing in Rwanda, the 
Clinton Administration has instructed its spokesmen not to describe the deaths there as 
genocide,” as the mounting moral pressure did not yet outweigh the complete lack of strategic 
gains to be had from Rwanda: “a landlocked African country to which the United States has no 
historic ties. Without oil or other resources as a rationale, the case for military intervention 
would have to be based on whether ending the killing is worth the cost in American lives and 
dollars.” By the time this article was published, human rights groups had demanded action on the 
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basis of fulfilling the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights and the Genocide Convention, “But 
Administration officials say they believe the treaty does not carry an absolute obligation to act” 
(Jehl, 1994). 
As action was first called for in the early 1990’s, western countries took weak steps 
toward reducing aid on the basis of human rights violations, and were quick to accept the image 
of steps taken towards progress. In 1990 and 1991, international policies gave humanitarian aid 
to Rwanda and supported democratization processes as the answer to reducing civic violence, so 
by 1992 and 1993, those countries supporting democratization had obliged themselves to 
continue supporting that process (Adelman, 1996). This meant the appearance of steps taken by 
the regime towards that end had to be recognized and they could not terminate aid.  
In addition, while many donor countries struggled to reconcile the ongoing need for 
humanitarian aid (which had since been relabeled as relief assistance) with reports of human 
rights abuses, the decision to impose conditions on aid was circumvented by administrative gaps. 
The position of Minister of Justice was vacant for most of 1993, meaning distribution of funds 
and reform in the justice system had virtually no leadership, and were suspended. Through this 
and other complications, aid packages were reduced for “bookkeeping and administrative 
reasons” rather than human rights conditions, giving up on any possible gains through that 
mechanism (Adelman, 1996, p. 32). 
It is logical to understand the inclination to avoid military action in an international 
conflict, and to minimize the cost and the risk to one’s own nation, however, in hindsight this 
inclination can look very different. In some cases, like Rwanda, it is possible to imagine that 
decisive international military intervention might have ended the conflict sooner and prevented a 
genocide that cost the lives of 800,00 people in less than three months. Human rights groups can 
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only advocate to those in power to do more than issue reports, and governments will only act on 
those reports when they are sufficiently pressured to do so. “Advocates also note that military 
force is sometimes the only option to prevent mass atrocities, and argue that the Rwandan 
genocide could have been avoided had nations used military force. Merely naming and shaming 
is often criticized as a paper tiger, and rights violators can simply ignore UN Human Rights 
Council resolutions—which are not legally binding—or UN Security Council (UNSC) 
resolutions that do not threaten military force. Moreover, during UNSC negotiations, resolutions 
are often severely watered down” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2012).  
Once the massacres ended in July of 1994, the RPF took power and with tenuous 
acceptance from the international community, began the process of rebuilding a society in which 
the Tutsi and Hutu could coexist. Similar to the Ayatollah in Iran, the post-conflict leader of 
Rwanda, Paul Kagame, has since committed his own version of oppression toward his opposition 
and free speech in the name of social justice. He has also, however, presided over decades of 
significant growth and reconstruction lending him the approval of most international leaders 
(The Economist, 2016). Again, only hindsight determines which regimes and which acts of 
violence are determined to be criminal violations or positive stability.  
This case demonstrates how economic and political strategy take priority over human 
rights, and even human lives. This tendency in government is the reason it is the social sector 
and public at large responsible to demand action; those few individuals in government to do so 
were ignored or replaced, and only when public attention grew to a level of widespread advocacy 
campaigns including international organizations and celebrity spokespeople did action occur. 
This is also a case where cultural differences were blatantly used as a dehumanizing tactic to 
circumvent taking action through simple language choice in labeling the violence as “tribal 
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wars” rather than “genocide.” The UN and most of the international community look back in 
hindsight at the reluctance to intervene  in Rwanda as a stark failure of global human rights 
policy and enforcement, though recent years of unanswered violence in nearby Darfur imply the 
system has not changed.  
El Salvadoran Civil War: 1980-1992 
The civil war that ravaged El Salvador for more than a decade has many similarities with 
Iran’s revolution. Both involved several groups in opposition to the regime coming together to 
pool power and influence despite their differing values and goals. Both saw the US supporting 
the existing regime in an effort to maintain a self-serving order. Both came as challenges to a 
regime consistently committing constant human rights violations while publicizing progressive 
policies to increase protections. The international response to the two conflicts however, 
differed. Iran saw virtually no intervention to ensure human rights protections at all, and direct 
action took place only after the revolution. Conversely in El Salvador, the UN was successfully 
compelled to carry out a “Truth Commission” to investigate human rights violations, though the 
effectiveness of that commission is debateable (Center for Justice and Accountability, 2016).  
El Salvador provides another stark example of a US backed brutal regime providing 
enough stability to the outside world that egregious acts of violence toward its own citizens were 
overlooked time and again. A series of loans from American banks in the 1920’s led to the 
creation of El Salvador’s wealthy elite, the “fourteen families” that ruled the economic system--
plantations--and the political system, for decades (Michaels, 1987). When the working class 
majority rebelled in 1932 and 30,000 people were massacred by the government in “la matanza,” 
the international community was silent. In 1968, when the government created authorized groups 
within the Ministry of Defense to maintain order by exterminating dissidents, the death squads 
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were literally named spanish for ‘order,’ ORDEN (Organización Democrática Nacionalista). 
ORDEN was left unchecked to murder Salvadoran citizens for 12 years before four American 
nuns were killed, finally prompting action (Michaels, 1987).  
American intervention after the deaths of its citizens illustrates obvious self-interested 
strategy. Jimmy Carter responded to the murders by cutting off aid to El Salvador in 1980, 
implying that four American lives that year were worth more than the thousands of Salvadoran 
lives lost the same way in the previous 12 years. Even worse, the following year Ronald 
Reagan’s new administration reinstated aid to the government to maintain “order” as a Cold War 
ally fighting back leftist opposition across the globe (Center for Justice and Accountability, 
2016).  
The following years of war portray any attention paid to human rights as an optional  
suggestion. The opposition had, until that point, consisted of many groups and individuals and 
only came together in 1980 to form the FMLN, or Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, 
after the assassination of human rights activist Oscar Romero and 42 others at his funeral. After 
aid was reinstated from the US to the right wing government in 1981, it came with calls to 
improve the situation of gratuitous violence and extrajudicial killings (Center for Justice and 
Accountability, 2016). A 1984 CIA intelligence memorandum states the government’s so-called 
efforts to do so “have made little progress and have been aimed almost exclusively at placating 
Washington” (Central Intelligence Agency, 1984). Washington was indeed placated enough to 
continue aid and avoid more extreme measures until 1989.  
The 1989 murder of four Jesuit priests and their housekeeper prompted the international 
intervention in peace processes and investigations that eventually led to the end of the war. In a 
significant reversal, after confirming that “19 of the 26 Salvadoran officers responsible had 
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received military training at the U.S. Army School of the Americas” (Center for Justice and 
Accountability, 2016), American aid turned to support of the UN assisted peace accords. “This 
indicates that in situations where the American government is culpable for a potential bloodbath, 
policy makers are loath to take on that responsibility, which significantly shapes their policy 
toward revolution in a way that it did not when President Carter called the commitment to human 
rights ‘absolute’” (Nelson, 2016). The violence committed by these officials was not in itself 
enough to cause the US to separate itself from the brutal government, until the US government 
was in danger of being associated too closely with sharing the blame. 
Long term accountability to resolving the conflict and securing justice was less than fully 
committed by the international community even after UN involvement. Support to both the 
government and the FMLN taking direct action had decreased, but investment to officially 
resolve the situation was also waning after the fall of the Soviet Union and end of cold war when 
battling the global leftists became less of a priority (Center for Justice and Accountability, 2016). 
El Salvador’s war officially ended after long failing negotiations with a mutual agreement to a 
UN Truth Commission report, though no real agreement was made to enforce accountability to 
what the report actually found (Boutros-Gali, 1993). The UN released the report denouncing 
massive abuses of rights and atrocities, and five days later the government announced blanket 
amnesty for those responsible. The amnesty protection is still active today with no enforcement 
of justice from the UN or anyone else (Center for Justice and Accountability, 2016). 
The complete lack of accountability is primarily due to the inadequacy of the judicial 
system within El Salvador to prosecute vast numbers of its own members, though no outside 
solutions have been proposed. “One painfully clear aspect of that situation is the glaring inability 
of the judicial system either to investigate crimes or to enforce the law, especially when it comes 
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to crimes committed with the direct or indirect support of State institutions...The Commission 
does not believe that a reliable solution can be found to the problems it has examined by tackling 
them in the context which is primarily responsible for them” (Boutros-Gali, 1993, p. 178). The 
report concludes rather apathetically that there is no “reliable solution” within the context of El 
Salvador’s judiciary, and does not follow this up with any indication of possibilities to change 
the context.  
Mathematicians say two points determine a pattern, a third confirms it. The same can be 
said in the case of El Salvador confirming the pattern laid out by the previous two cases of Iran 
and Rwanda. International interventions claiming to be protecting human rights had little to do 
with human rights realities or those who had suffered abuses of their rights, and everything to do 
with self-interest and political or economic strategy. The pattern of enforcement and 
accountability is also clear; even when the international community has absolute confirmation of 
violent and widespread violation of international human rights law, there is virtually nothing 
done to enforce consequences once stability has been re-established. 
Discussion 
It is useless to criticize a perceived lack of morality in government, or a focus on self 
interest over justice. These are facts of government for the reasons discussed in the literature 
review, and will not change. It is useless to criticize human rights appearing as a facade for 
strategic intervention, because it will not change. What can be useful is the acceptance of these 
facts among advocates for change, and the ability to work within them. The first step: drop the 
facade. It is clear that governments act for strategic aims, so appeal to the strategy. It is clear they 
prioritize security and economic prosperity, so appeal to security and economic gains. 
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Those advocating for action should be aware not only of the strategic goals of their 
targets and the priority of those goals, but also a deep understanding of the direct and indirect 
costs of both action and inaction. The indirect or hidden costs are often much higher than the 
direct cost, and bringing these to light in a clear and specific message within the framework of 
national security or economic effects can force the government to a tipping point of action. 
Rights, priorities and accountability are interpreted and accepted or rejected by the 
public, not the government. The government has the power to respond or not to public demands, 
and the public has the power to pressure the government. The power of the public and the 
responsiveness of the government of course depend on the type of government in a given 
country, and sovereignty gives each country the power to determine their own type of 
government. Sovereign governments protecting their own interests and differing interpretations 
of international rights and obligations make enforcing “universal” rights a daunting battle. 
Governments may not be able to be held accountable to a moral standard, but they can be 
held accountable to their own policies. Unfortunately they are too often not, which provides a 
practical starting point for an advocacy campaign aiming to protect human rights. El Salvador’s 
Truth Commission report succinctly describes government hypocrisy in all three cases outlined 
here, as well as countless others across the world: “The political, legislative and institutional 
mechanisms required to ensure the existence of a society subject to the rule of law existed in 
theory, at least in part, but the reality was not what it should have been, perhaps as a 
consequence of excessive pragmatism” (Boutros-Gali, 1993, p. 182).  
A particularly grim but undeniable pattern in all three cases here suggests that the 
“excessive pragmatism” determining the tipping point for western countries to act can be traced 
to western lives, or specifically white lives. In all three cases, direct intervention by western 
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countries was immediately preceded by attacks on white westerners: American embassy workers 
taken hostage in Iran, Belgian peacekeepers killed in Rwanda, and American nuns killed in El 
Salvador. In each situations thousands of “others” had been killed unanswered, but with only a 
small handful of white westerners the cost suddenly became too high. This is not meant as 




● Frame aid and intervention requests first and foremost within the framework of national 
security impacts to the country from which action is being requested  
● Package advocacy messages into specific, strategic actions being requested that are in 
line with the strategic goals of the advocacy targets as well as being morally acceptable 
by both the targets and the advocates; avoid messages using morality as the basis to act 
● In public awareness campaigns aimed at raising public support to pressure governments 
to act, push understanding of the government’s political and economic strategic goals to 
the public in way that presents them as pragmatic rather than pessimistic or immoral 
● Collaborate with other groups only when specific outcomes and how to manage them in 
the long term are clear to avoid outcomes that favor only one group’s needs or goals 
● Accept small concessions and steps toward progress only when doing so will not cost the 
momentum or attention required for long term goals 
Intervening governments should… 
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● Recognize internal dissent and advocates appealing to international audiences from 
within sovereign states; recognize diverse ideologies in foreign states rather than 
homogenizing the “other” 
● Examine the cultural implications of intervention and incorporate these into planning and 
trainings 
● Build culturally appropriate relationships with those with whom they will be working 
throughout and after the intervention  
● Develop ongoing enforceable accountability and monitoring mechanisms in conjunction 
with local leaders 
Culture cannot be preserved within human rights law because culture evolves. Traditions 
can be preserved, though this is not inherently a positive goal as not all traditions are positive. 
Freedom and tolerance of diversity can be preserved, and freedom and diversity allow the 
expression of culture and traditions as they adapt and evolve. Western democracies looking to 
spread this particular ideology should exercise caution, however, to avoid the cultural 
imperialism of forced democratization across the world and setting impossible policy 
expectations.  
Human rights policies should be looked at the way MDGs and SDGs are--as a set of 
goals to aspire to with action plans created to implement a process of change. They should not 
and cannot be taken as current standards, in part because that is unrealistic and unenforceable, 
and also because they are not standardizable. When governments, international bodies, and the 
advocates holding them accountable can look at complex and subjective issues of human rights 
and interventions with a strategic analysis, each group will be more equipped to understand the 
messages and requirements of the other. When these messages are understood, appeals for 
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intervention can be more effective, and hopefully the interventions themselves can be more 
effective. The international community will never resolve all debates on these issues, and will 
never be free from human rights violations for good, but can certainly improve the efficiency and 





MISSING THE MESSAGE: ADVOCATING FOR ACTION IN HUMAN RIGHTS   37 
Brief reflection on sustainable development 
Sustainability requires strategic, contextual and achievable planning. Current human 
rights laws and policies are not constructed to be strategic, contextual or realistically achievable. 
Policies and systems to implement them are virtually unenforceable, which means interventions 
can be purely based in self-interest. Interventions themselves are often equally lacking in 
strategic and contextual planning, giving the minimum commitment necessary.  
If this research can approach the idea of how to incorporate sustainable, strategic 
solutions into human rights policy or interventions, it will have achieved its goal. Maintaining 
human rights across the world is a joint effort; it requires collaboration and motivation from 
governments, multilateral organizations, the social sector, the private sector, and the public at 
large. Without each of these groups accountable to another for providing and portraying accurate 
information and acting on it, egregious violations of human rights will be allowed to continue. 
Only with sustained efforts and vigilant attention can the global community prevent or stop these 
mass violations when they occur.  
Developing nations--perhaps even more so nations in the process of reconstruction 
following war or other disaster--are at particular risk of allowing human rights violations as a 
trade off for economic growth and short-term political stability. The international community 
and human rights advocacy groups have a significant role to play in assuring these development 
and re-development efforts are built upon a stable base of rights and justice if they are to 
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